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JTURISDICTION BY NECESSITY-AN ANALYSIS
OF THE MULLANE CASE
By GEORGE B. FRASER, JR.4
One of the most significant decisions of the last several years is
the case of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company.'
In this case the Supreme Court of, the United States had to determine
when a court has jurisdiction to settle a 'trustee's account. However,
in order to decide that question the Court had to consider two questions
of even greater importance; first, may a court hear a case even though
it has neither jurisdiction in personam nor jurisdiction in rem, and
second, does notice by publication satisfy due process in actions that
are not in personam. Since these two problems are basic to any dis-
cussion of jurisdiction, they will be discussed in this article along with
the Mullane case itself.
I
An action to settle a trustee's account is brought to determine the
propriety of the trustee's management of the trust funds.2 If there
has been any mismanagement, the trustee is personally liable for re-
sulting loss. Therefore, when it settles his account, the court must
litigate questions that affect the trustee's personal liability. This means
that the court must have jurisdiction in personam of the trustee before
it may hear such an action.3 Jurisdiction of the trustee also gives the
court the exclusive right to control and administer the trust even
t A. B. 1936, Dartmouth College; LL. B. 1939, Harvard University; LL. M.
1941, George Washington University; Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma.
1. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Hereinafter 339 U.S.
2. Bor.ERT, TRusTs 461 (2d ed. 1942).
3. See Roberts v. Michigan Trust Co., 273 Mich. 91, 262 N.W. '744 (1935).
Since trustees are jointly and severally liable, it is not necessary for a court to have
jurisdiction of all of them when there are several as it can proceed against those
who have been properly served. 2 ScoTr, TRUSTS § 224.6 (1939).
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though it does not have actual possession of the fund.' For this reason,
the Supreme Court held in Princess Lida v. Thompson that only one
action to settle an account may be pending at any one time.' In this
case two trustees brought an action for the settlement of their account
in the Common Pleas Court of Pennsylvania. The next day two bene-
ficiaries brought suit in equity in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania against the same trustees, alleg-
ing mismanagement of the trust funds and praying an account and
surcharge. Thereafter the trustees moved to dismiss the bill in the
federal court claiming that the state court had exclusive jurisdiction
of the controversy. When the federal court refused to dismiss the
action, the state court enjoined the beneficiaries from proceeding further
in the federal court. This injunction was upheld by the Supreme Court
of the United States, which stated:
"We have said that the principle applicable to both federal
and state courts that the court first assuming jurisdiction over
property may maintain and exercise that jurisdiction to the ex-
clusion of the other, is not restricted to cases where property has
been actually seized under judicial process before a second suit
is instituted, but applies as well where suits are brought to marshal
assets, administer trusts, or liquidate estates, and in suits of a
similar nature where, to give effect to its jurisdiction, the court
must control the property." 6
However, other suits 'to establish the right to an interest in the trust
fund are permitted since they do not affect the management of the
trust.
7
Since two suits to settle an account may not exist at the same time,
such proceedings are not true in personam actions because the existence
of one action in personam does not prevent either party from bringing
a second action for the same transaction. In Kline v. Burke Construc-
tion Company the Supreme Court stated, "the rule, therefore, has be-
come generally established that where the action first brought is in per-
4. In Commonwealth Co. v. Bradford, 297 U.S. 613, 619 (1936), it was stated
that "Property in its (the trustee's) possession is not in cistodia legis as in case of
receivers." However that difference does not prevent a court from exercising juris-
diction in rem. In Glasser v. Wessel, 152 F.2d 428, 430 (2d Cir. 1945), it- was
stated, "It would be indeed a feeble difference if the failure of the trustee to put the
fund into the actual custody of the court, left it without jurisdiction to do what it
could have done, if it had had that custody. It is well settled that, if it had had
custody the judgment would have been good without personal service, so far as it
undertook merely to determine interests in the fund."
5. 305 U.S. 456 (1939).
6. Id. at 466.
7. Commonwealth Co. v. Bradford, 297 U.S. 613 (1936); Waterman v. Canal-
Louisiana' Bank and Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33 (1909).
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sonam and seeks only a personal judgment, another action for the same
cause in another jurisdiction is not precluded." 8
The beneficiaries are the ones who will lose if the trust has been
mismanaged. Therefore they may bring an action to compel the trus-
tee to account and to surcharge him for any loss. They are also in-
terested in any action for an accounting that is brought by the trustee.
In the Mullane case the Supreme Court said:
"In two ways this proceeding [to settle the trustee's account]
does or may deprive beneficiaries of property. It may cut off their
rights to have the trustee answer for negligent or illegal impair-
ment of their interests. Also, their interests are presumably subject
to diminution in the proceeding by allowance of fees and expenses
to one who, in their names but without their knowledge, may
conduct a fruitless or uncompensatory contest." 9
For this reason it is usually stated that all the beneficiaries must be made
parties to such an action or the decree settling the account will not be
res judicata as to those who are not joined.Y In one case, which was
brought by one of several beneficiaries, the court held that the other
beneficiaries must be made parties to the action so that the trustee would
not be harassed by a series of suits. The court stated that "Unless the
remaining cestuis que trustent are made parties to the suit, they will
not be bound by the accounting had in it, nor will they be bound by
the ascertainment of the moneys that shall be decreed to be paid to the
complainant." " The court did not state what it meant when it held
that the other beneficiaries must be made "parties to the suit." Must
they be served with process so that the court would have jurisdiction
in personam of them? Usually a court must have jurisdiction in per-
sonam of both persons before it has the power to determine conclusively
if one is liable to the other."-  However most courts have held that
it is only necessary to give the beneficiaries notice by publication. 13
Whether or not this is sufficient was the subject of litigation in the
Mullane case. 4
8. 260 U.S. 226, 230 (1922).
9. 339 U.S. at 313.
10. See 2 Scort, TRUSTS § 260 (1939).
11. Speakman v. Tatem, 45 N.J. Eq. 388, 390, 17 Atl. 818, 819 (Ch. 1889).
12. E.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518, 522 (1916) ; Brown
v. Smart, 145 U.S. 454, 458 (1892) ; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Martin, 88 N.H. 346,
347, 189 At. 162, 163 (1937).
13. E.g., Roberts v. Michigan Trust Co., 273 Mich. 91, 103, 262 N.W. 744, 748
(1935).
14. The appellant did not claim that the beneficiaries must be made parties to the
action; he only challenged the method of giving notice to'the beneficiaries. Brief for
Appellant, p. 13. However, the Supreme Court itself raised this question, stating:
"We are met at the outset with a challenge to the power of the State-the right of
its courts to adjudicate at all as against those beneficiaries who reside without the
State of New York." 339 U.S. at 311.
1951]
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This case involved a common trust fund composed of 113 par-
ticipating trusts with numerous beneficiaries who were residents of
different states. The fund was established under a statute which pro-
vided that at the time an investment is first made in a common trust
fund the trustee must mail a notice to the beneficiaries of the individual
estates or trusts whose money is being invested. This notice must con-
tain a copy of the statutory provisions relating to the settlement of the
trustee's accounts.15 According to these provisions a trustee must
obtain a judicial settlement within twelve to fifteen months after the
common trust fund is established and triennially thereafter. 16  When
such an action is begun'. the trustee must publish a notice once a week
for four weeks in a newspaper designated by the court. This notice
must list the participating trusts, but it does not have to name either
the beneficiaries or the donors of the trusts. In addition, the court must
appoint two guardians, one for persons who have an interest in the
income of the trust and one for persons who have an interest in the
principal.' 7 The decree settling the account is conclusive as to any
matter contained therein upon everyone having an interest in the
common fund.' s
The trustee in the Mullane case gave the required notice when the
common trust fund was established. He also published the proper
notice when he filed his account for settlement. In addition, the court
appointed the necessary guardians. However, the beneficiaries were not
subject to the jurisdiction of the court because they had not been served
with process. Also they had not consented to be sued in New York.
Yet the Supreme Court held that if they had been notified of the action
the trial court could settle the account and bind them by the decree.
Thus a court does not need personal jurisdiction of the beneficiaries
in order to have the power to settle a trustee's account and to determine
conclusively his liability for mismanagement.' 9
II
Since a court does not need jurisdiction in personam of the bene-
ficiaries in order to bind them by a settlement of an account, is the action
a proceeding in rem? Three things are necessary for an action in rem:
the court hust have control of a res, notice must be given to persons
15. N.Y. BANK. LAW § 100-C(9).
16. Id., § 100-c(10).
17. Id., §100-c(12).
18. Id., §100-c(14).
19. Even then a beneficiary may reopen a decree for fraud or misrepresentation.
2 ScoTr, TRuSTS 1172 (1939). This same rule applies to executors and administra-
tors. MacKenzie v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 262 Mich. 563, 247 N.W. 914 (1933).
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whose interests are affected, and the decree must affect the title or status
of the property which is subject to the court's control." In the Mullane
case the court had control of the trust fund because the action was
brought by the trustee. Therefore if the proper notice were given, the
court would have the power to determine the title or status of the trust.
Thus the court could determine who the beneficiaries were.2 How-
ever, the issue in the Mullane case did not affect the title of the trust;
it only affected the trustee's personal obligation.
Personal obligations may be litigated in either an action in rem
or an action quasi in rem if the res would be affected by the proceeding.
Thus, in an action quasi in rem, a plaintiff may assert a claim against
a person who is not a party to the action but who has an interest in
the property that is subject to the jurisdiction of the court, even though
the claim has no relationship to that property, because the property
would be used to satisfy the obligation after it was established.22 How-
ever a court may not determine if a plaintiff is liable to the defendant
because such an adjudication would not affect the title or status of
any property. It would only affect the personal relationship between
the two persons so that jurisdiction in personam would be necessary.
The plaintiff's obligation, itself, may not be considered as a res for
the purpose of giving the court jurisdiction to litigate the validity of
that obligation. In Maryland Casualty Company v. Martin 2 an in-
surance company brought an action to determine if it were liable to cer-
tain defendants who were nonresidents. These defendants had not been
served with process but had been notified of the action. The court
held that this was not sufficient, stating that "Due process does not
permit one denying himself to be a debtor to compel, by service out-
side his state, a nonresident claiming to be a creditor to have the lia-
bility adjudicated in the courts of that state." 24 This is the reason that
a court does not have jurisdiction to interplead a nonresident claimant
if a personal obligation is involved 25 although it may interplead a non-
20. Fraser, Actions in Ren, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 29 (1948).
21. Franz v. Buder, 11 F.2d 854 (8th Cir. 1926). In one case involving the settle-
ment of an estate the court stated, "While the order of partial distribution of August
12, 1919, will protect the administrators in the disbursement of the funds of the
estate to persons who were then in good faith believed to be the heirs of the deceased,
this protection will not extend to protect one of such administrators in the disburse-
ment of such funds to himself as such heir." In re Coyne's Estate, 103 Okla. 279,
283, 229 Pac. 630, 633 (1924).
22. Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire and Rubber Co., 285 Fed. 214 (6th
Cir. 1922); see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
23. 88 N.H. 346, 189 Atl. 162 (1937).
24. Id. at 347, 189 Atl. at 163..
25. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
19511
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resident claimant if tangible property is involved.2" An obligation that
is owed to the defendant by a third person may be the res for an action
quasi in rem, as in garnishment proceedings. However, in that situa-
tion, the creditor is not the plaintiff.
When a court acting in rem litigates a personal obligation, the per-
son against whom the claim is asserted is not bound by the decision as to
his personal liability although he is bound by any disposition that is
made of his property.17  The personal obligation may be the subject
of a later action.28 This is illustrated by Fitch v. Huntington which in-
volved a note secured by a mortgage on Iowa land. 9 When the mort-
gagee brought an action on the note in Wisconsin, the mortgagor
claimed that this action was barred by a former action in Iowa in
which the Iowa court, determining that the note had been discharged,
removed the mortgage as a lien on the land. Since the mortgagee had
not been a party to the Iowa action, the Wisconsin court rejected this
defense holding that the decree cancelling the mortgage was binding
on the plaintiff but that it could not affect the defendant's liability on
the note.8" This holding is in accord with. Riley v. New York Trust
Company. In that case the Supreme Court of the United States stated
that an action in rem "does not bar litigation anew by a stranger, of
.facts upon which the decree in rem is based." "
Since a decree settling an account does not affect title to property,
a court acting in rem would not have jurisdiction of such a proceeding.
Also, a decree settling an account is different from a decree in rem be-
cause it bars further litigation of a personal obligation. Therefore, the
Mullane case was neither in personam nor in rem. This was pointed
26. See Glasser v. Wessel, 152 F.2d 428, 430 (2d Cir 1945), in which a trust
fund was considered as a tangible res. However, a claimant who is not subject to the
jurisdiction of the court will not be prevented from asserting a claim against the stake-
holder. Hanna v. Stedman, 230 N.Y. 326, 130 N.E. 566 (1921).
27. The defendant may still be bound by the issues litigated if he appears specially.
Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v. Sternberg Dredging Co., 189 Miss. 73, 191 So. 94
(1939). Contra: Cheshire National Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 112 N.E. 500
(1916).
28. Brigham v. Fayerweather, 140 Mass. 411, 5 N.E. 265 (1886). RESTATmET,
JUDGMENTS § 73(2) (1942). Even the plaintiff in an action in rem may later bring
an action on the same cause of action if jurisdiction is in personam or based on
power over different property. Van Horst v. Thompson, 18 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir.
1927).
29. 125 Wi§. 204, 102 N.W. 1066 (1905).
30. The court stated: "The Iowa court held that the note had been discharged,
but this holding was only effective so far as it formed a basis for removing the lien.
It had no effect upon the personal liability or the note, because the man who held
title to that personal liability was not before the court, except by substituted service,
and his rights to enforce that personal liability could not be affected." Id. at 208,
102 N.W. at 1067.
31. 315 U.S. 343, 353 (1942). Therefore if a court grants interpleader when
it has jurisdiction in rem the claimant may still sue the stakeholder in an action in
personam. See note 26 supra.
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out by the Supreme Court when it stated that, "It is not readily apparent
how the courts of New York did or would classify the present proceed-
ing, which has some of the characteristics and is wanting in some
features of proceedings both in rem and in personam." 32 Thus a court
must be exercising a third type of jurisdiction when it settles a trustee's
account.
III
As indicated by the previous section, the Mullane case permits a
court to adjudicate conclusively the relations between two persons even
though one of them is not a party to the action. Although this is
unusual, it is permitted in a few situations when it is impossible to ob-
tain jurisdiction in personam and the question must be litigated. For
instance, it would usually be impossible to settle a trustee's account
if total jurisdiction in personam were necessary because there would
be no one place where the trustee could get jurisdiction of all the bene-
ficiaries. The common fund in the Mullane case, for example, con-
sisted of 113 participating trusts with numerous beneficiaries who were
residents of different states. The Supreme Court recognized this need
when it stated:
"It is sufficient to observe that, whatever the technical de-
finition of its chosen procedure, the interest of each state in provid-
ing means to close trusts that exist by the grace of its laws and
are administered under the supervision of its courts is so insistent
and rooted in custom as to establish beyond doubt the right of
its courts to determine the interests of all claimants, resident or
nonresident, provided its procedure accords full opportunity to
appear and be heard." 8
Actions for a divorce are also examples of jurisdiction by necessity.
They do not ifnvolve a res but only affect the personal relations of the
parties. Therefore, they are not in rem. The Supreme Court recently
stated, "The historical view that a proceeding for a divorce was a pro-
ceeding in rem . . . was rejected by the Haddock case. We like-
wise agree that it does not aid in the solution of the problem presented
by this case to label these proceedings as proceedings in rem. Such a
suit, however, is not a mere in personam action." " For this reason
a court may grant a divorce although the defendant spouse is not made
32. 339 U.S. at 312.
33. Id. at 313. This argument would seem to apply with almost as much force
to interpleader actions except that the necessity is not so great since the passage of
the Federal Interpleader Act.
34. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297 (1942).
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a party to the action if he is a nonresident who cannot be served with
process. Similarly a court has jurisdiction of an adoption proceeding
even though the natural parent is a nonresident. 5
In each of these cases the court is terminating an existing relation-
ship with a nonresident. The interest that a state has in its citizens
gives it the power to do this in spite of the fact that it deprives the non-
resident of certain benefits that might result from the relationship.36
However, this interest will not permit a court to terminate all obliga-
tions that are owed by resident plaintiffs to nonresidents who are not
parties to the action. In Estin v. Estin the Supreme Court held that
a court does not have the power to terminate the plaintiff's obligation to
pay support money to a -spouse who had not been served with process
even though it could grant a divorce. Also, a court cannot determine
that a relationship exists between the plaintiff and a nonresident defend-
ant who is not served with process because the effect of such a deter-
mination would be to impose a legal obligation on a person who is not
a party to the action. Thus a court cannot determine that the plaintiff
is married to a nonresident. Also it cannot declare that a nonresident
is the plaintiff's father. In the recent case of In re Hindi the Supreme
Court of Arizona held that a court could determine the parentage of a
child only if it had jurisdiction in personam of the alleged father. 8
The opposite result was reached by a California Superior Court on the
ground that the action was in rem.39 However, no property was sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the court nor would any property be affected
by the decree, so the court was not acting in rem. There are cases in
which the Supreme Court of the United States has gone further in
imposing a liability on nonresident defendants. Cases involving non-
resident motorists are illustrations.4" In such cases jurisdiction is based
on acts done within the state although the fiction of an agency relation-
ship is used. However, even this theory would not support the Cali-
fornia case because the defendant had never been in California.
35. Stearns v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 67 N.E. 349 (1903). See RaSTATEENT,
CoNicr oF LAWS § 142 (1934).
36. "The interest of the State extends to its domiciliaries. The State should have
the power to guard its interest in them by changing or altering their marital status
and by protecting them in that changed status throughout the farthest reaches of the
nation. . . . They entitle the State of the domicile to bring in the absent spouse
through constructive service." Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948).
37. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
38. 71 Ariz. 17, 222 P.2d 991 (1950).
39. This case is unreported; however, for further proceedings in connection with
the same action see Hammerstein v. Superior Court of California, 341 U.S. 491
(1951).
40. E.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
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IV
Although it is not necessary to make the beneficiaries of a trust
parties to an action to settle the trustee's account, the Mullane case held
that they are not bound by the decree unless they are notified of the
proceeding and given a chance to be heard. This is a basic requirement
of due process. No specific method of giving notice need be used pro-
vided the method adopted is "reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to appraise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." 41
Therefore, the notice that was given when the common trust fund was
established was not sufficient because it did not advise the beneficiaries
of the time and place of action.42 Also, the notice by publication that
was given when the trustee brought his action for a judicial settlement
of his account was not sufficient for beneficiaries who had a present
interest in the trust and whose addresses were known. The Court
stated:
"It would be idle to pretend that publication alone as pre-
scribed here, is a reliable means of acquainting interested parties
of the fact that their rights are before the courts . . . Chance
alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertise-
ment in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper, and
if he makes his home outside the area of the newspaper's normal
circulation the odds that the information will never reach him
are large indeed." 4
It also added:
"Publication may theoretically be available for all the world
to see, but it is too much in our day to suppose that each or any
individual beneficiary does or could examine all that is published
to see if something may be tucked away in it that affects his prop-
erty interests." "
Therefore, notice by mail was suggested as a more desirable means
of advising the beneficiaries. "However it may have been in former
times, the mails today are recognized as an efficient and inexpensive
means of communication." " The fact that postal notification was used
at the time the common trust fund was established indicated to the
Court that it would not be a serious burden to require that it be used
at the time of an accounting.
41. 339 U.S. at 314.
42. Id. at 318.
43. Id. at 315.
44. Id. at 320.
45. Id. at 319.
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The Court did say that notice by publication would be sufficient if
reinforced by other acts, as by an attachment, but there was nothing
in the Mullane case that would reinforce the publication. Possession
by the trustee did not have this effect because the trustee had posses-
sion of the trust fund prior to the commencement of the'action. The
opinion stated that ". . . it is their caretaker who in the accounting
becomes their adversary." 11 Even the appointment of the guardians
was not sufficient to reinforce the publication because it did not have
the effect of advising the beneficiaries of the proceeding. Therefore, the
case was reversed as to beneficiaries who had a present interest in the
trust and whose addresses were known.
The Supreme Court held that notice by publication is sufficient for
persons whose addresses are unknown as there is no other way to
notify them. Also, notice by publication is sufficient for persons whose
interests "are either conjectural or future" if other persons who are
interested in the same subject matter are given better notice, because
these latter persons would protect the interests of those who are given
notice by publication. Therefore, in the Mullane case, appellant's ob-
jections to notice by publication were overruled in so far as they related
to beneficiaries whose interests or addresses were unknown.
The Mullane case is the latest in a series of decisions that have
discussed the kind of notice that must be given in actions in rem. In
Cooper v. Reynolds 47 the Supreme Court held that seizure of the prop-
erty was in itself sufficient to give notice of such an action. A few years
later in Windsor v. McVeigh 48 the Court held that seizure alone was
not sufficient because it did not supply any information about the time
and place of the hearing. "The jurisdiction acquired by the seizure is
not to pass upon the question of forfeiture absolutely, but to pass upon
that question after opportunity has been afforded to its owner and
parties interested to appear and be heard upon the charges. To this
end some notification of the proceedings, beyond that arising from
the seizure, prescribing the time within which the appearance must be
made, is essential." " In addition, the notice must indicate that the de-
fendant's property is involved. If the plaintiff is enforcing an existing
interest in land, as in an action to foreclose a lien or to obtain specific
performance of a land sale contract, information about the action itself
will indicate that specific property will be affected by the result. How-
ever, if the action is quasi in rem, there must either be seizure of the
property or the notice must show that specific property is involved
46. Id. at 316.
47. 10 Wall. 308 (U.S. 1870).
48. 93 U.S. 274 (1876).
49. Id. at 279.
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because a description of the action itself will not convey that informa-
tion.5"
Prior to the Mullane case there had been very little discussion of
the method that should be employed to give notice provided some kind
of notice was given. In McDonald v. Mabee the Supreme Court held
that notice by publication is not sufficient to give a court jurisdiction
in personam of a defendant who has left a state intending not to re-
turn." The Court stated, "To dispense with personal service the sub-
stitute that is most likely to reach the defendant is the least that ought
to be required if substantial justice is to be done." 52 However, in
actions in rem, the Supreme Court has upheld notice by publication
without considering if another method of giving notice would be more
adequate or if the publication was reinforced by other acts. In Arndt
v. Griggs the Court stated, "These various decisions of this court es-
tablish that, in its judgment, a State has power by statute to provide
for the adjudication of titles to real estate within its limits as against
non-residents who are brought into court only by publication; and that
is all that is necessary to sustain the validity of the decree in question in
this case." " There is nothing in the opinion to indicate that the de-
fendant's address was unknown. The plaintiff had to give an affidavit
that the defendant could not be found within the.state, but this does
not mean that he could not be located. Also, there was nothing that
would reinforce the publication. The plaintiff was in possession of
the land but that does -not reinforce the publication because he had been
in possession of it prior to the commencement of the action so that no
change of possession occurred at the time the action was begun. The
statute provided that the judgment could be opened within five years;
however, that provision is meaningless if a defendant has no notice of
the action. State courts have not followed Arndt v. Griggs but have
held that notice by publication is not usually sufficient. In Hollis v.
Tilton the Supreme Court of New Hampshire stated that "In general,
constructive notice as by publication, is insufficient if personal notice
in some form is reasonably practical." 54
50. Compare Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900), wtdth Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714 (1877).
51. 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
52. Id. at 92.
53. 134 U.S. 316, 327 (1890). In this case the question of jurisdiction was raised
in a collateral proceeding, whereas in the Mullane case it was raised by appeal. Cf.
Tannhauser v. Adams, 182 P.2d 280 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.), aff'd on other grounds,
31 Cal.2d 169, 187 P.2d 716 (1947), in which a California District Court of Appeals
held that the publication of a delinquent tax list was sufficient notice of a tax sale
even though the statue provided for notice by publication and by mail.
54. 5 A.2d 29, 32, modified on other grounds, 6 A.2d 753 (N.H. 1939). In
People v. One 1941 Chrysler 6 Tour Sedan, 180 P.2d 780, 788, rehearing, 183 P.2d
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V
In the Mullane case the Supreme Court was interpreting the due
process clause. Therefore the holding that notice by publication is
unsatisfactory applies to all types of proceedings where notice must
be given to persons whose interests are affected. For this reason, the
effect of this holding on other types of actions will be considered.
Statutes in many states only require a person to post or publish
notice of a probate proceeding. These statutes do not satisfy the
requirements of due process because such notice does not advise heirs
and next of kin that a probate proceeding is pending. Possession of
the decedent's property by the executor or administrator does not re-
inforce notice by posting or publication because the property was not
taken from the possession of the heirs or next of kin. Thus the fact
that the personal representative has possession of the decedent's prop-
erty is no more significant than was the trustee's possession of the trust
fund in the Mullane case.
Since a probate proceeding consists of several distinct steps, a
second problem arises. Must notice of each step be given, or is notice
at the beginning sufficient for the whole proceeding? In the Mullane
case the Supreme Court held that the notice that was given when an
investment was first made in a common trust fund was insufficient to
satisfy due process even though the beneficiaries were advised that the
trustee must account within twelve to fifteen months and triennially
thereafter. Similarly, notice at the beginning of a probate proceeding
is not sufficient notice of future hearings because it does not advise per-
sons whose interests are affected when these various hearings will
occur. Therefore, a separate notice of each phase of a probate proceed-
ing must be given., Michigan Trust Company v. Ferry 5 is often cited
for the proposition that notice at the beginning is sufficient in states
whose statutes make a probate proceeding a single action.56 However,
this case does not discuss the necessity of notice for successive stages
of a probate proceeding. It holds that a court does not have to obtain
service of process on a person it appoints as executor in order to sur-
charge him. Ferry was appointed executor by a Michigan court. Later,
proceedings were begun in the same court to remove him and to obtain
an accounting. Ferry had moved to Utah so he was not served with
368, 378 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947), the court stated, "Due process is a variable con-
cept. Whether it has been violated depends upon the facts of the case. Where alter-
natives are given it requires that that alternative reasonably calculated to notify the
person affected must be used."
55. 228 U.S. 346 (1913).
56. E.g., Simes, The Administration of a Decedents Estate as a Proceeding in
Rem, 43 MicH. L. REv. 675, 689 (1945) ; Comment, 50 Mica. L. REv. 124, 137 (1951).
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process, but he was given actual notice of this proceeding. The Michi-
gan court found that Ferry was liable to the estate and rendered judg-
ment against him. In an action on the judgment which was begun in
Utah, it was held that the judgment was unenforceable because Ferry
was not served with process when the Michigan action was begun.
This holding was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States
on the ground that a court has jurisdiction of an executor from the
time of his appointment. The Court emphasized that the Michigan
proceeding was in accordance with due process because actual notice
was given.
Notice by publication is usually permitted in divorce cases when
the defendant is a nonresident. However, its use when the defendant's
address is known violates the rule in the Mullane case because such
notice is not litkely "to appraise interested parties of the pendency of the
action." When a defendant's address is unknown, publication is the
only possible method of giving notice because no attachment or other
method of seizure is possible; but this should not justify the use of
notice by publication when the defendant's address is known. At the
same time that it grants a divorce, a court may award defendant's prop-
erty to the plaintiff. If the property is located within the state and
proper notice has been given, a court has the power to do this. How-
ever, before such action is taken, the defendant should be notified that
the plaintiff is not only seeking a divorce but is asserting a claim against
his property. Either notice by mail or seizure of the property and
notice by publication would be sufficient. If the property is already in
the possession of the plaintiff, the latter method would not be sufficient
since there would be no change of possession at the time the action is
brought. However, if the defendant's address is unknown, notice by
publication must be used.
Most states require that a notice be mailed to the defendant in a
divorce action. Also, if property is involved, both the petition and the
notice must indicate that fact and the property must be attached.
5 7
However, some cases hold that notice by publication is sufficient even
when a better method of giving notice could be used.""
Custody and adoption proceedings are similar to divorce actions
in that the decree either limits or completely terminates an existing re-
lationship-usually the parent-child relationship-between two persons.
Therefore, the natural parent must be notified of the pendency of such
57. Forrester v. Forrester, 155 Ga. 722, 118 S.E. 373 (1923); Geary v. Geary,
272 N.Y. 390, 6 N.E.2d 67 (1936).
58. Wesner v. O'Brien, 56 Kan. 724, 44 Pac. 1090 (1896); Closson v. Closson,
30 Wyo. 1, 215 Pac. 485 (1923).
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an action.5 9 Even when he has been deprived of the custody of his
child by a prior judicial proceeding, the parent is usually given notice
of a subsequent suit for adoption.6" Thus in Ex parte Parker " the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that a mother was entitled to notice
of an adoption proceeding even though custody of the child had been
awarded to an association and the statute provided that service on the
association was sufficient to authorize the court to hear the matter. 2
This holding is correct because a legal relation still existed between
them. As one Texas case pointed out, the father could still inherit
from the child.' Also, the parent should have a chance to be heard
on the question of what is best for the child. Moreover, notice of one
action is insufficient to constitute notice of a subsequent proceeding
that may be brought months and perhaps years later. Therefore, this
case is in accord with the Mullane case. However, one court held that
notice was not necessary because the statute did not require consent.64
Unfortunately this court c6nfused two different problems, consent and
notice. By misconduct the parent may lose the right to object to the
adoption of his child, but he is still entitled to notice prior to the
complete severance of the parent-child relationship. If the parent has
been deprived of custody because he abandoned the child, it is usually
stated that he is not entitled to notice of the adoption proceeding,65
although he must be given notice of the prior action so that he may be
heard on the issue of abandonment.66 This holding is wrong because
the natural parent is still entitled to notice unless the prior proceeding
completely terminated the parent-child relationship.
67
When it is necessary to give notice to a natural parent who is a
nonresident, the rules laid down in the Mullane case as to the proper
method of giving notice should be followed. If his address is known,
the parent should be given personal notice or mailed notice. If his
address is unknown, notice by publication must be used. Unfortunately
many statutes authorize notice by publication when notice by mail could
be given. One court has even held that where the statute required
59. In Fielding v. Highsmith, 152 Fla. 837, 840, 13 So.2d 208, 209 (1943), the
court stated, "Even where adoption statutes do not specifically require personal notice
to be given, it must be presumed that the legislature intended that the natural parents
should have an opportunity to be heard before having their rights to the child de-
clared forfeited; if such statutes are to be upheld as constitutional."
60. Rubendall v. Bisterfelt, 227 Iowa 1388, 291 N.W. 401 (1940); Lacher v.
Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 188 N.W. 613 (1922).
61. 195 Okla. 224, 156 P.2d 584 (1945).
62. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 110 (1941).
63. Pearce v. Harris, 134 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1939).
64. In re Hardesty's Adoption, 150 Kan. 271, 92 P.2d 49 (1939).
65. In re Asterbloom's Adoption, 63 Nev. 190, 165 P.2d 157 (1946) ; cf. Hersey
v. Hersey, 271 Mass. 545, 171 N.E. 815 (1930).
66. State ex rel. Thompson v. District Court, 75 Mont. 147, 242 Pac. 959 (1926);
Schiltz v. Roenitz, 86 Wis. 31, 56 N.W. 194 (1893).
67. See Fielding v. Highsmith, 152 Fla. 837, 840, 13 So.2d 208, 209 (1943).
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either personal service or notice by publication notice by mail is in-
sufficient. 8
In guardianship cases a different problem is presented. Actual
notice is insufficient because of the ward's incapacity, therefore a guard-
ian ad litem should be appointed prior to the settlement of the guardian's
account in order to satisfy due process.69 This is not inconsistent with
the Mullane case even though in that case the appointment of the
guardian was held to be insufficient to constitute due process. It only
indicates that due process depends on the circumstances of each case.
When a person is not subject to any legal disability, a reasonable effort
to give actual notice must be made. When a person is subject to a
disability, a guardian must be appointed to protect his interests. This
is true in all types of cases, not just guardianship cases.
In actions to quiet title notice by publication is subject to the same
objection that is raised in other cases where it is uied; that is, persons
whose interests are affected are not likely to know that the action is
pending. Even though a court is acting in rem, persons whose claims
constitute a cloud on the plaintiff's title should be given personal notice
or notice by mail if their address is known. The fact that the claimant
is in possession of the property is not sufficent to reinforce notice by
publication since no change of possession occurs at the time the action
is brought. Notice by publication is also insufficient in actions for
specific performance of land sale contracts when the court is acting
in rem unless it is reinforced by seizure of the property.
CONCLUSION
To settle a trustee's account a court must have jurisdiction in
personam of the trustee, but personal jurisdiction of the beneficiaries is
not necessary. However, the beneficiaries must be notified of the pro-
ceeding. According to the Mullane case notice by publication is not
sufficient to satisfy due process if a more adequate means is available.
This is true not only for actions to settle a trustee's account but for
all types of proceedings where it is necessary to give notice to persons
whose interests will be affected by an action. Thus, jurisdiction is not
based on power alone. Fairness to both parties is becoming the major
consideration in determining if a court has jurisdiction of a case. In
fact, where it is reasonable and necessary, a court may act even though
it has no power over the defendant.
68. In re Ives, 314 Mich. 690, 23 N.W.2d 131 (1946).
69. It was first held in Hollis v. Tilton, 90 N.H. 119, 5 A.2d 29 (1939), that the
appointment of a guardian ad lite= was a constitutional requirement. On rehearing
the court held that the constitution did not require the appointment of a guardian,
but, "in the exercise of reasonable discretion one must be appointed." 6 A2d 753
(1939).
